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Chapter Two

PRACTICAL PITFALLS IN HANDLING
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
by John W. Reed*

In this article we are concerned with the techniques of what is
more often an art than a science. Before going into the specifics, it is
useful to take a look at scientific evidence in general-where it
stands in relationship to other kinds of evidence, on what theory or
theories it is admitted, and how to maximize its effect when it is
admitted.
I am an academic lawyer who deals with students rather than
clients and with books rather than cases. At first blush, there may
appear to be something inappropriate in my identifying for practitioners practiced pitfalls in handling scientific evidence. But, as the
late Jerome Michael was fond of saying, only the theoretical is practical-by which he meant, of course, that an understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of any legal procedure is the most practical,
the most useful knowledge conceivable.
In cases I have seen in which counsel seems to have stumbled, usually he has forgotten or ignored fundamentals. The best way to avoid
pitfalls and to achieve maximum results, whichever side one is on,
is to identify and deal with the fundamental elements, on which the
admissibility of scientific evidence depends. These questions are particularized applications of principles governing admissibility of evidence generally.
"Professor, University of Michigan Law School.
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BASIC PRINCIPLES
Let me refresh your recollections of the basic principles. Let's take
a guided tour along the path to admissibility and persuasion. There
are some potholes in the road, and even some deep pits, and it is my
task to help you avoid them.
The fuse pitfall to avoid is the tendency to be overawed by the
scientific aspect. All too often, lawyers are as bemused as jurors by
the mystique surrounding the men of science and their black boxes
with styluses and meters and graphs and lights and buzzers and
computer printouts. The great god of science is not omnipotent.
The best way to avoid overvaluing scientific evidence is to become
as familiar as possible with the science, and to remember that characterizing something as scientific should not cause a lawyer to suspend his usual skepticism about evidence of all kinds, including
rigorous application of the pertinent rules of evidence concerning
relevance, opinion, hearsay, witness competency, and the like. In
short, don't deal with scientific evidence as if it were some exotic
kind of proof, out of another world.

Relevancy
That leads us to the second and perhaps major point that needs
to be made. The principal, usually controlling, issue about the admissibility of scientific evidence is a relevancy question. Scientific
evidence is nearly always circumstantial, and the proponent must
show a connection between the evidence offered and the inference
sought, the conclusion desired.
When I was in law school we commonly spoke of "legal relevance," an amalgam of judgments about the strength of the evidence
and the problems it presented. Now, relevance is more generally and
more properly dealt with as a term referring only to the logical connection between the evidence offered and the inference desired. Logical relevance is simply the tendency of the evidence offered to make
18
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the existence of the disputed fact more probable ( or less probable)
than it would be without the evidence. We then leave to a second
stage the identification of counter-factors of prejudice, confusion,
waste of time, etc. At that stage-or as a third step, if you preferthe logical strength of the evidence is balanced against the counterweights, and the judge makes a heavily discretionary ruling as to admissibility in context. 1
I want to deal with scientific evidence problems in those three
stages: first, relevance; second, identification of the dangers; and
third, the weighing.
As a condition of admissibility, it is necessary to show the validity
both of general scientific propositions and of particularized applications. For example, with respect to speed measurement by radar, it
is necessary first to get the court to accept the validity of the Doppler
effect or Doppler-shift principle for measurement of motion. That is
a general scientific proposition. Then it is necessary to get the court
to accept the radar device as a particularized application of the
Doppler-shift principle.
There are three ways in which a court may be led to conclude that
there is a valid, applicable scientific principle.

Judicial Notice
First, it may be induced to accept such a proposition by virtue of
judicial notice. Judicial notice will be taken of principles that are
common knowledge, are known to a specialized group, or are verifiable with certainty by resort to a readily accessible source (actuar ial
tables, periodic charts of the elements, and the like). Judicial notice
is more appropriate and therefore more easily taken as to general
principles than to specific applications: blood alcohol rather than
specific measuring devices; the Doppler effect rather than a given
radar instrument; stress evaluation rather than a particular polygraph.
1. See Rules 401 and 403 of che new Federal Rules of Evidence.
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A court in taking judicial notice may handle the matter badly and
the attorney may -find that h e has fallen into the pit, in part through
his own fault. In an excellent arricle, Qr,estions Affecting the Admissib;tity of Scientifi c Evidence:! Professor John Strong recounts
such an instance in which the prosecution sought to present radar
evidence. After introducing the testimony of two patrolmen concerning the results obtained from a radar instrument, the prosecution
asked the court to take judicial notice of radar as an accurate method
of determining automobile speed. The court's response, heard by the
jury, was:
All right .... [T} he Court will take judicial notice of the
fact that radar detection devices, when used to determine
speed, are accurate or are reliable . ... All I'm trying to
say with my judicial notice--! wish it to be limited. I'm
sure ... [the attorneys] will agree with that - .. . that
the method . . . used here is one that has proved co be reliable. If you analyze those words I think you will see they
say quite a bit. I say no more. ( People v. Schmidt, 118 Ill.
App. 2d 476, 479, 254 N.E.2d 810, 812.)

In fact the trial judge had said too much. The appellate court reversed
because the words could well have indicated to the jury that the
findings of a radar unit are not subject to challenge. Professor Strong
comments:
Of what did the trial court intend to take judicial notice
in Schmidt? Apparently the court intended to notice the
general _principle underlying radar and possibly also the
validity of the particular device used by the Illinois Highway Patrol. Judicial notice for the first and possibly the
second purposes would have been proper. It is clear, however, that the court intuitively recognized that there was
some additional point which should not be foredosed
2. 1970 Law Forum 1, 18-19.
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by judicial notice, though it was unable clearly to articulate precisely what this was. This additional point, which
the appellate court correctly concluded should have been
left to the jury, was the question of whether the radar
device had been properly used.
Of course, the immediate cause of the error was "the trial court's
failure to distinguish among the various questions raised by the evidence." But, Strong notes, "the error may be laid equally at the doorstep of the prosecutor in failing to lay a foundation for the evidence
in the order most calculated to prevent the confusion which arose,
that is, by requesting judicial notice of the device before offering
his evidence as to use." In other words, counsel's tactical error lay
in inviting judicial notice at a time and in a manner that induced
the court to take judicial notice of a particular application as well as
of the general principle.

Testimonial Evidence
The second way of establishing the relevance of a scientific principle and its particularized applications is through testimonial evidence. An expert is placed on the stand, is sworn, and explains to
the court the principles and techniques and devices involved. There
is, of course, the requirement that the expert be qualified by training or experience or both. There is nothing unusual about that. In
this field, however, in addition to the requirement that the expert be
qualified to supply or apply the scientific principle, it is required also
that the principle have achieved general acceptance in the scientific
community. The classic statement of this requirement appears in
Frye v. United States: 3

3. 293 F. 101 3, 1014 ( D.C. Cir. 1923).
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Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrative stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized and while
courts will go a long way in admittin,g expert testimony
deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must
be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the parttcular field to which it belongs.

General Acceptance
Obviously, the key phrase is "general acceptance." Whatever the
phrase means, ir does nor mean unanimity of approval. A California
case, People 1 Williams/ held char it was enoug h if the principle is
accepted by those who would be expected co be familiar with its use
(whatever that means) . Approved in Willitons was a test for narcotics use char was accepted only by a particular-and apparently
small-segment of the medical profession. "In this age of specialization, more should not be required.""
The
illimns approach, however, presents especially difficult
problems in cases involving ionovarive procedures and newly discovered principles, such as voiceprinrs. The earliest case dealing with
voicepcinrs occurred in 1966-less than cen years ago. The numerous
cases dealing with this scientific technique apparently have involved
testimony by the same seven or eight experts. That the matter is still
a lively and uncertain one is indicated by the articles in this volume.
Although unanimity is nor required something more than endorsement by a single scientist will be required . I must note the existence of one case that seems to permit evidence on the endorsement
of a single scientist-the famous CoptJ o/ino(; case. There a doctor
1•

, j_ 3.1 l P 2d 251 ( 1958).

5. Id. ac 254.
6. 223 So. :'d 6S ( Fla. App. 1%8), app. diw,imd, 23-i So. 2d 120 ( Fla. 1969),
,-al. ,lc11i~d. 3!:!9 U.S. 927 ( 1970 ).
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testified that, contrary to the general view, he could detect the presence of a particular poison ( succhinyl choline) in human tissue, that
he had tested in the particular instance, and that he found presence
of the poison in the body of the decedent. The court admitted that
testimony for the jury to deal with as it wished. The Coppolino case
is surely unusual if not unique.

"Paraffin Retreat"
Of course there: is always the danger that courts will endorse principles later shown to be invalid or untrustworthy. Then it becomes
necessary for us to pull back. A good illustration is the use of the
paraffin test to detect the presence of nitrates on the hand of an individual who allegedly fired a gun. For a long time the test was approved and· held admissible in prosecutions. Recently, however, it
has been discovered that numerous other substances besides the nitrates from gunpowder will produce an affirmative response to the
tes:, and courts generally now will not admit the results of a paraffin
test.
The lesson of the "paraffin retreat" is that however important it
may be for courts to make use of the help available from forensic
science, it is equally important that they not rush to judgment in
uncritical acceptance of principles endorsed by only a few or inadequately tested or explored.

Articles and Treatises
A third method of getting a court to accept as relevant a scientific
principle straddles judicial notice and testimonial evidence. It is the
use of a book to establish the principle, its acceptance, and possibly its application. Traditionally, articles and treatises could not be
so used because of the obvious hearsay objection. Rule 803 ( 18) of
the Rules of Evidence, however, will change that situation in the
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federal courts; and one may safely predict that numerous states soon
will follow suit. Let me read to you the language of that rule:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even
though the declaranr is available as a witness: ... ( 18)
Learned creatises.-To the extent called to the attention of
an expert witness upon cross-examination or relied upon
by him in direct examination, statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of
history, medicine, or ocher science or art, established as a
reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the
witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice.
If admitted, the statements may be read into evidence but
may not be received as exhibits.
Note that the book (or pamphlet or whatever) must be shown
to be a "reliable autboriry" by testimony or by judicial notice, and
that it must either be called to the attention of an expert on eras examination or relied on by him in direct examination. Once chose
e::onditions are met the contents of the treatise are admissible as
substantive videoce. This may be of considerable help ro counsel
seeking to gee the court co hold relevanr particular cientific evidence
where the authorities are discant or expensive but have, fortunately,
written an expository book.

Analyzing Testimony

In determining relevance, we must be sure we understand what
the experts are telling us. Here is where the lawyer needs to be
skeptical and careful. For example, there may be testimony that a
lie detector is 95 percent reliable. That is a high degree of reliability
indeed, and in most settings it would seem co call for admissibility
of properly authenticated results. As pointed out, however, in Shattuck, Brown, and Carlson, The Lie Detector ,1s ,1 Sttrl'eillrmce De11ice/
7. 24-26 ( 1973 ACLU reporc, mimco ed.).
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reliability in context may be quite another matter. Suppose, for example, that out of a thousand employees, 25 are embezzlers. The
mathematics of that calculation is as follows:
In fact inn ocent

975
Polygraph results:
95 % right
5 % wrong

926
49

In fact guilty
25
24
1

Thus, 7 3 ( 24 plus 49) are diagnosed as guilty whereas only 24
actually are guilty. Thus, the ratio of reliability is 24/ 73, or about
33 ½ percent, not 95 percent.
If the assumption is that there are only five embezzlers out of a
thousand employees, then the figures look like this:

Polygraph results:
95 % right
5% wrong

In fact innocent

In fact gttilt')1

995

5

945

5

50

0

On these facts, 55 (5 0 plus 5) are diagnosed as guilty but only five
in fact are guilty. Here, the ratio is 5 / 55, or a mere 9 percent.
Another illustration of the necessity of being sure that we know
what the scientists are telling us lies in the use of nuclear activation
analysis. All that a NAA test shows is that the questioned substance
is indistingttishahle from the exemplar; it does not show that it is
identical. 8 Thus, if the paint chip found on the hit-run defendant's
car is indistinguishable from paint on the plaintiff's car, the releS. See Karjala, The El'icle11tia ry U1 e of N11clear Actirntio11 A11af),1is, 59 Calif. 1. Rev.
99 ( 1971 ) ; George, Use ,111tl ,V/iSl(se uf Scie111if,c Ez,irle11ce, Effective Use of Scientific Evidence 1, 23 (Seventh Annual Crim. Advocacy Handbook , PLI 1974).
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vance of that sameness depends on the number of cars with that
kind of paint. If there are hundreds or thousands, the significance
of finding a fleck of that paint on defendant's car is slight indeed,
whereas if only two cars are known to have that kind of paint, the
significance is very great.
Moreover, in the NAA cases one must be sure that all the supporting assumptions are valid. For example, there seems to be an easy
assumption that NAA testing of hair samples may be highly relevant
to identity, as where hairs found at the scene of a crime are "indistinguishable" from hairs taken from the head of the defendant. Yet
the assumption that each person's hair always has the same characteristics is myth only; hairs from one person's head vary widely in
composition.fl If the variation in composition of hairs of a single
person is as great as between single hairs taken at random from different people, then there is no statistical significance in a finding
that a hair from the defendant's head "matches" the hair found
clutched in the victim's hand.
Do not, I say, become bemused by the science and forget to ask
what it is the science is supposed to establish in this case.

Countervailing Factors
Now let us deal for a moment with the countervailing factors
that a court should identify and deal with in deciding whether to
admit the results of a test making use of a principle, the scientific
validity of which has been testified to by a qualified expert witness.
First, there is possibly, but not likely, a due process problem. The
Rochin 10 case excluded capsules of morphine produced by forcing an
emetic into defendant's stomach through his nose despite his physical
resistance. But the Supreme Court has upheld the admissibility of
blood samples taken from an unconscious defendant, 11 and, even,
9. George, rnpra footnote S.
10. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 ( 19 52).
11. Brei th aupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1937).
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from a conscious, protesting defendant, who did not, however, resist
physically. 1 ~
Second, there is sometimes said to be a confrontation problem.
Surely this is not a genuine difficulty, because it is not the machine
or the "black box" that is testifying against the defendant; and
surely also the confrontation clause never assumed that objects, which
cannot be placed on the witness stand, were inadmissible when
relevant in criminal trials. In any event, scientific evidence always
comes in with an explanation by and endorsement of a witness who
performed the test; and he is there confronting the defendant and
ready to be cross-examined by him.

Used with Prejudice
Third and finally, the most important counter-factor is the possibility that the evidence will be overvalued, that it will be given
more weight by the factfinder than its genuine merit warrants. One
of the best illustrations of this factor is the lie detector or polygraph.
There is no doubt that standard tests of logical relevance would make
the results of a properly conducted polygraph test admissible as
bearing on the credibility of the person subjected to the test. Indeed
the reliability factor is higher than that of many other kinds of evidence admitted without the slightest hesitation.
The difficulty is that whatever the reliability ( probably less in
application than in theory), the jurors may, by the apparent objectivity and almost magical aura of the device, be persuaded to a
position of near certainty, whereas the rational force of the results
ought to be significantly less than that. In short, the danger has been
and continues to be that the lie detector, however probative it is, will
be used irrationally and with great prejudice.
This element of possible overpersuasion inheres in much of scientific evidence and must always be taken into account by a court in
12. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 ( 1966) .
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determining whether to admit a particular kind of scientific evidence.
By the same token, counsel seeking to admit or to bar scientific evidence will be well advised to direct their advocacy not only to the
scientific validity of the principles and devices involved but also to
the essentially non-rational, emotional effect of the evidence.

Proper Method

After the scientific principles have been established, it is necessary
to show that the method was properly used on the occasion in
question.
First, the "technician" who operated the device must meet a
standard of competence. On occasion, this requirement can infect a
whole area of scientific evidence, as for example lie detectors. A recurring theme in the cases dealing with-and rejecting-lie detector
evidence is chat there are no standards of competence for polygraph
operators, with the note usually added that there are in fact many
incompetent operators. The courts tend to say that until some standards are developed and applied under which an operator may be
tested and accredited, there is no chance to have lie detector test results admitted in evidence.
But what I have in mind here is, rather, the requirement that the
credentials of the operator-of ({ ny scientific device-must be shown
in the particular case. When the operator, adequately qualified, is on
the witness stand, he may be examined about the fundamental theory
as well as about the· immediate application of the theory in the test
conducted by him. The tendency, as the use of a device becomes more
common, is to employ technicians of less and less expertise ( such as
police officers in the case of breathalyzers and radar), making more
difficult cross-examination to attack the scientific reliability of the
test. In any event, the competence of the witness must, of course,
be shown.
28
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Condition of Device
A second requirement of admissibility is that there be testimony
as to the condition of the particular device used on this occasion. The
device must have been checked against some standard. The testing
requirement is occasionally statutory. For some kinds of scientific
evidence, spot checks will suffice. But what will suffice and what will
persuade may be two entirely different things, and the wise advocate
will ordinarily go well beyond the minimum foundation.
Third, if a substance has been tested by the use of a device ( for
example, a blood sample, a hair, a piece of cloth), then it is absolutely
essenrial that there be evidence clearly establishing the identity,
source, and if important, condition, of the substance-all of which
we call chain-of-custody evidence.
In sum, rhere must be evidence that the method was properly
used on this occasion. Sketchy proof of what actually was done may
be worse than merely unpersuasive; it may result in inadmissibility.
Professor Strong provides another illustration: State ·v. Mitler. 18
There, defendant was prosecuted for driving while intoxicated, and
the results of a Drunkometer test were admitted over objection. The
sole foundation laid consisted of the following:

Q: Now, Officer, subsequent to the time when you completed
the oral and physical examination, did you give this defendant
a Drunkometer test?
A: I did, Sir.
Q: And at what time did that test take place?
A: ... At 2: 3 7 a.m. the test was given to the defendant. It was
completed at 2: 40 a.m. with a reading of .21.
Q: And what did this test consist of?
A: This was by use of the Drunkometer, a chemical test to determine the amount of alcohol, thereby determining, under the

13. 64 N.J. Super. 262, 165 A.2d 829 (1960) .
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Statute, whether the defendant is fit or unfit to operate a motor
vehicle.
Q: And what was the reading, Sir?
A: .21 %. 14

On appeal, the admission of the evidence was held erroneous even
though the appellate court was willing to take judicial notice of the
validity of the Drunkometer as a device. Said the court: "Considering
the brevity of the examination and the emptiness of the answers, the
court should have honored the objection ... and should have required the State to supply the foundation testimony." 1 "
The point should be iterated: A foundation with respect to the
particular test and test substances is indispensable both to admissibility and persuasiveness.
As noted, the court must look to the counterweights they: suggest
exclusion, even though it finds that the test has considerable scientific
validity and proffering counsel has laid a foundation that includes a
believable showing with respect to the qualifications of the witnesstechnician, the condition of the testing devices employed, and the
identity and condition of the thing tested or examined.
The weightier the counter-factors, the more showing of relevance
we require. This is traditional doctrine, anciently stated in the phrase
"legal relevance" and now separated into its principal components. 10
The considerations to be applied and the approach to be taken are
not significantly different in 1975 when applied to voiceprints and
breathalyzers than they were early in the century when fingerprints and X-rays were new. The science changes, the evidentiary
principles do not.

1,i. Id. at 831.
15. Id. at 832.
16. See again rules "101 and ..j03 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
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EXALTATION OF SCIENCE
The more subtle problem, however, as stated above, is the contemporary exaltation of science and the tendency of otherwise rational and skeptical human beings to accept in blind faith even outrageous claims of men of science. It is essential that lawyer and judge
apply the acid of skepticism to determine what the true alloy of truth
and witchcraft may be.
Currently, there may be a little less need to reject scientific evidence for fear of juror misuse if ( 1) the public is becoming more
sophisticated, ( 2) lawyers are improving their skills of cross-examination in these matters, and ( 3) both the lawyers and the factfinders
are beginning to understand that it is nearly always the expert opinion
of a witness-a particular human being-that we are looking at,
rather than the infallible product of a "black box."
Finally, an examination of cases involving scientific evidence suggests that one of the easiest pits to fall into is the lawyer's uncritical
employment of the scientific jargon of his expert witnesses. Again
and again he fails to understand that it is essential for a translation
to take place if communication with and persuasion of lay factfioders
is to occur. That burden rests ultimately on counsel. If he does not
see to it, likely no one ,viii. As essential as it is that scientific evidence
be dealt with logically in terms of foundations, qualifications, and explanation, it is equally essential that the answers be in "plainspeak"
-in simple, one or two-syllable words understood by counsel and
understandable to all the jurors.
The key to admissibility of scientific evidence is relevance or
foundation; the key to persuasion is clarity and simplicity.
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